



REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE COVID-19 CRISIS AND BEYOND:  
THE CAPACITY AND LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
MICHELLE FOSTER, HÉLÈNE LAMBERT AND JANE MCADAM§ 
 
 
The current pandemic and concomitant framework of crisis has led to 
unprecedented restrictions on global movement, and hence on the ability of 
refugees to seek protection. These measures have been implemented as a matter of 
urgency on account of the immediacy of the public health challenge, yet risk 
violating international refugee and human rights law. This experience provides an 
opportunity to reflect on an equally compelling, although less imminent, threat, 
namely displacement linked to the impacts of climate change. This article considers 
these twin challenges and reflects on the capacity and limits of international law 
to address both crises, while balancing the competing rights and interests at stake. 
It argues that a key challenge for international law and policy is how to harness 
the sense of urgency generated by COVID-19 for the long-term ‘climate crisis’, 
without resorting to emergency mechanisms of reactive, short-term, restrictive, 





The global COVID-19 pandemic has been described repeatedly as unprecedented, 
necessitating emergency measures by states that would ordinarily be unacceptable. Framed as 
a ‘crisis’,1 its exceptionality has justified special restrictions and exclusions. How an issue is 
framed matters because ‘it determines how a phenomenon is understood and responded to – 
both normatively and pragmatically’.2 Indeed, the ‘placement of the problem is a necessary 
founding act’.3  
 
One of the most unparalleled and pervasive responses to the COVID-19 public health crisis 
has been worldwide border closures and travel restrictions. These have curtailed people’s 
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movement across the globe, creating inconvenience for many but potentially life-threatening 
risks for would-be refugees. The prevention of cross-border movement – which is a threshold 
requirement for legal recognition as a refugee4 – presents a fundamental challenge for the 
international protection regime.  
 
The mobility challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic sound an alarm bell for another 
context as well. As the Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum observed so astutely: 
‘The COVID-19 public health emergency and its ensuing humanitarian and economic fallout 
offers us a glimpse of what the global climate change emergency can become – if it is left 
unchecked and if we do not act now’.5 While the risks may be less imminent, they are no less 
profound. 
 
This article explores what the twin crises of COVID-19 and climate change reveal about the 
capacity and limits of the international law of protection. As we approach the 70th anniversary 
of the adoption of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee 
Convention’), one of the oldest human rights treaties in the post-World War II order, we reflect 
on its capacity to assist people in need of protection whose movement is restricted. We also 
consider the tension in broader human rights treaties to accommodate an emergency while also 
upholding fundamental rights. Central to this analysis is the notion of ‘crisis’, and how this 
affects the speed, nature and duration of responses, as well as the capacity for international 
cooperation and inclusion. 
 
Part II briefly outlines the core challenges posed to protection by the pandemic, noting both 
positive and negative state practices. Part III examines the international legal framework and 
its ability to accommodate a state of emergency, considering both the Refugee Convention and 
the ‘International Bill of Rights’ (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’)6 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘ICESCR’)).7 Part IV then widens our perspective by moving away from the immediacy of the 
current crisis, to consider the future of international protection in the context of climate change. 
We posit that a challenge for international law and policy is how to harness the sense of urgency 
generated by COVID-19 for the long-term ‘climate crisis’, without resorting to the familiar 
emergency mechanisms of reactive, short-term, restrictive, and exceptional measures.8  
 
II THE PANDEMIC AND REFUGEE PROTECTION 
 
A The Backdrop 
 
                                                 
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954) art 1A(2) (‘Refugee Convention’), read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). 
5 Dame Meg Taylor, ‘COVID-19 and Climate Change: We Must Rise to Both Crises’, Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (Feature Article, 17 April 2020) <https://www.forumsec.org/2020/04/17/covid-19-and-climate-
change-we-must-rise-to-both-crises/>. 
6 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR’). 
7 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) (‘ICESCR’). 
8 Crisis narratives ‘translate into, and justify, short-term, ad hoc responses instead of pre-emptive, integrated 
approaches’: Elodie Hut et al, ‘COVID-19, Climate Change and Migration: Constructing Crises, Reinforcing 
Borders’, Environmental Migration Portal (Blog Post, 2020) 
<https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/blogs/covid-19-climate-change-and-migration-constructing-crises-
reinforcing-borders>. See also Charlesworth (n 1). 
 
 
By April 2020, it was estimated that around 39% of the world’s population – or some three 
billion people – were living in states that had closed their borders to all non-citizens and non-
residents, with very limited exceptions.9 When combined with measures to prevent citizens 
from leaving their own country, and the shutdown of much of the global aviation industry,10 
the limitations on the right to seek asylum11 were profound. According to the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), as at 11 March 2021, 57 states’ borders were 
completely shut, 31 states had no COVID-19 related border restrictions, while 81 had imposed 
restrictions but made exceptions for asylum seekers.12  
 
Australia was a country that restricted movement in both directions, as well as internally 
through state and territory border closures. Indeed, its prohibition on citizens and permanent 
residents leaving the country was quite exceptional.13 In the first five months of the pandemic, 
the Commonwealth, states and territories had passed over 800 pieces of legislation,14 
authorising ‘imminent and extraordinary measures’15 on account of the ‘severe and immediate 
threat’16 posed by the virus. Among the laws were provisions prohibiting entry to17 and 
                                                 
9 Phillip Connor, ‘More than Nine-in-Ten People Worldwide Live in Countries with Travel Restrictions amid 
COVID-19’, Pew Research Centre (Fact Sheet, 1 April 2020) <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/04/01/more-than-nine-in-ten-people-worldwide-live-in-countries-with-travel-restrictions-amid-covid-
19/>. A smaller number of states shut their borders entirely, including in Central Asia and Ecuador. See also, 
‘COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker’, International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (Web Page) 
<https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker/?location=&issue=24&date=&type=> (filtered by ‘movement’). 
10 As at August 2020, there had been a 57–64% reduction in international passenger numbers: International 
Civil Aviation Organization, Effects of Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) on Civil Aviation: Economic Impact 
Analysis (Report, 12 August 2020) 5. 
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 A (III), UN GAOR, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 
1948) art 14(1) (‘UDHR’); see also ICCPR art 12. 
12 ‘COVID-19 Platform: Temporary Measures and Impact on Protection’, UNHCR (Web Page, 7 March 2021) 
<https://im.unhcr.org/covid19_platform//> (‘COVID-19 Platform’). 
13 Chris Uhlmann, ‘This Pandemic Has Revealed the Authoritarian Streak in Australian Governments’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (online, 19 August 2020) <https://www.smh.com.au/national/this-pandemic-has-revealed-the-
authoritarian-streak-in-australian-governments-20200818-p55mrh.html?btis>; see ‘COVID-19 and the Border: 
Leaving Australia’, Department of Home Affairs (Web Page, 28 August 2020) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20200830193346/https://covid19.homeaffairs.gov.au/leaving-australia >. 
14 Tim Game, ‘The Bar Rises to Meet the Challenges of COVID-19’ (Winter 2020) Bar News 4; for details, see 
‘Coronavirus (COVID-19) Legislation Orders, Directions, Regulations & Related Resources’, Federal Court of 
Australia (Web Page) <https://www.fedcourt.gov.au/covid19/legislation>. Only a handful of these were primary 
legislation scrutinised by Parliament. The legislation/instruments referred to below were current as at 11 March 
2021. 
15 See, eg, Administrator of the Territory of Christmas Island, Extension of Declaration of State of Emergency (4 
March 2021); Administrator of the Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Island, Extension of Declaration of State of 
Emergency (4 March 2021). 
16 See, eg, Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) 
Declaration 2020 (Cth) s 6(d), as at 3 March 2021. See also Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) 
(Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) (Overseas Travel Ban Emergency Requirements) Determination 
2020 (Cth). 
17 See, eg, Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) 
(Emergency Requirements) Determination 2020 (Cth) s 5, as at 2 September 2020; Restricting Cruise Ships 
from Entering Queensland Waters Direction (No 2) 2020 (Qld) s 3. 
 
 
departures from the country,18 interstate travel,19 movement into particular areas or venues,20 
and requirements that people self-isolate and not move about in the community.21 All 
Australian states and territories apart from New South Wales have been declared to be in a 
‘state of emergency’.22  
                                                 
18 See, eg, Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) 
(Overseas Travel Ban Emergency Requirements) Determination 2020 (Cth) s 5. 
19 See, eg, Christmas Island (Coronavirus Emergency – Entry and Quarantine) Direction 2020 (No 3) (Cth); 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands (Coronavirus Emergency – Entry and Quarantine) Direction 2020 (No 3) (Cth); Public 
Health (COVID-19 Lord Howe Island) Order 2020 (NSW); Border Restrictions Direction (No 5) 2020 (Qld); 
Restricted Access to Designated Areas Direction (No 3) 2020 (Qld); Directions in Relation to King Island, 
Flinders Island and Islands in the Furneaux Group of Islands 2020 (Tas); Quarantine (Closing the Border) 
Directions 2020 (WA), enacted 5 April 2020. An Emergency Declaration, Travel Ban, and movement 
restrictions were also put into place for Norfolk Island: see, eg, Norfolk Island, Norfolk Island Government 




20 See, eg, Public Health (COVID-19 Residential Aged Care Facilities) Order 2020 (NSW); COVID-19 
Legislation Amendment (Emergency Measures) Act (No 1) 2020 (NSW) sch 2 cl 2.5, sch 2 cl 2.2; COVID-19 
Directions (No 24): Directions for Aged Care Facilities 2020 (NT); Aged Care Direction (No 4) 2020 (Qld); 
Hospital Visitors Direction (No 3) 2020 (Qld); Emergency Management (Residential Aged Care Facilities No 4) 
(COVID-19) Direction 2020 (SA); Direction under Section 16 (Residential Aged Care Facilities – No 7) 2020 
(Tas); Care Facilities Directions (No 4) 2020 (Vic); Hospital Visitor Directions (No 4) 2020 (Vic); Remote 
Aboriginal Communities Directions (No 3) 2020 (WA); Visitors to Residential Aged Care Facilities Directions 
(No 2) 2020 (WA). 
21 See, eg, Public Health (Returned Travellers) Emergency Direction 2020 (No 5) (ACT); Public Health (Self-
Isolation) Emergency Direction 2020 (ACT); Public Health (COVID-19 Self-Isolation) Order 2020 (NSW); 
Public Health (COVID-19 Maritime Quarantine) Order 2020 (NSW); Public Health (COVID-19 Air 
Transportation Quarantine) Order 2020 (NSW); COVID-19 Directions (No 32): Directions for Territory 
Border Restrictions 2020 (NT); COVID-19 Directions (No 21): Directions for Potentially Infected Persons 
2020 (NT); COVID-19 Directions (No 7): Directions for Infected Persons 2020 (NT); Home Confinement, 
Movement and Gathering Direction (No 6) 2020 (Qld); Self-Isolation for Diagnosed Cases of COVID-19 
Direction (No 3) 2020 (Qld); Self-Quarantine for Persons Arriving in Queensland From Overseas Direction 
(No 3) 2020 (Qld); Emergency Management (COVID-19) (Isolation Following Diagnosis or Close Contact) 
Direction 2020 (SA); Emergency Management (Continuation of Overseas Travel Self-Quarantine) (COVID-19) 
Direction 2020 (SA); Direction in Relation to Persons Arriving in Tasmania 2020 (Tas); Direction under 
Section 16 (Stay at Home Requirements – No 5) (Tas); Direction Under Section 16 (Quarantine – No 1) (Tas); 
Direction under Section 16 (Isolation – No 2) (Tas); COVID-19 Omnibus (Emergency Measures) Act 2020 
(Vic) ss 112K, 600M; Direction and Detention Notice (No 4) (Vic); Diagnosed Persons and Close Contacts 
Directions (No 2) (Vic); Airport Arrivals Direction 2020 (Vic); Cruise Ship Docking Direction 2020 (Vic); 
Emergency Management Amendment (COVID-19 Response) Act 2020 (WA); Chevron FIFO Worker Directions 
2020 (WA); Exempt Traveller (International and Domestic Flight Crew) Approval and Conditions (No 2) 2020 
(WA); Isolation (Diagnosed) Directions 2020 (WA); Quarantine and Isolation (Undiagnosed) Directions 2020 
(WA). 
22 The following measures were current as at 11 February 2021. Australian Capital Territory: Public Health 
Emergency Declaration (No 1) 2020 (ACT) (declared 16 March 2020) last extended on 19 November 2020 until 
17 February 2021 by Public Health (Emergency) Declaration Further Extension (No 12) 2020 (ACT). New 
South Wales: New South Wales is the only state not to have declared an emergency because the Minister for 
Health has broad powers to deal with a public health emergency under the Public Health Act 2010 (NSW) s 7. 
Northern Territory: ‘Declaration of Public Health Emergency’ in Northern Territory, Government Gazette, No 
S10, 18 March 2020, last extended a period of 90 days (commencing 23 December 2020) by ‘Extension of 
Operation of Declaration of Public Health Emergency’ in Northern Territory, Government Gazette, No S55, 11 
December 2020. Queensland: ‘Public Health Emergency Order’ in Queensland, Queensland Government 
Gazette, No 25, 31 January 2020, 97, last extended on 17 December 2020 until 31 March 2021 by Public Health 
(Further Extension of Declared Public Health Emergency: COVID-19) Regulation (No 6) 2020 (Qld). South 
Australia: Declaration of a Major Emergency 2020 (SA) (declared 22 March 2020), last extended 4 February 




The explosion of laws in this one state (Australia) exemplifies the plethora of legal instruments 
that emerged globally to contain the spread of the virus by containing mobility. A public health 
emergency is, of course, one of the few permitted grounds on which the right to free movement 
and the right to leave one’s country can be constrained.23 However, as the UNHCR’s Assistant 
High Commissioner for Protection has observed, the ‘long-term risk posed by COVID-19 is 
that the adoption of emergency laws and policies may become entrenched or “baked in”’24 – a 
risk that is heightened the longer the pandemic lasts. Current modelling suggests that the virus 
will recur in a number of waves, and there is no reliable prediction of it ending before the global 
availability of a vaccine or the development of herd immunity.25 While the imminent risk posed 
by COVID-19 may therefore justify restrictions on movement, international law requires that 
such restrictions be stringently monitored to ensure that they are removed once no longer 
necessary and proportionate.  
 
B Refugee Law 
 
The challenges posed to refugee protection by the pandemic are profound. To be a refugee, a 
person must have crossed an international border. This element is well established in 
international law,26 and a constant reminder of the limits of the refugee definition and 
international protection. This notion of alienage27 is also encapsulated by the principle of non-
refoulement, the cornerstone of the protection regime, which prohibits removal to any place 
where a person faces a real risk of persecution or other serious harm.28 Hence, for refugees, 
                                                 
(SA). Tasmania: ‘Declaration of State of Emergency’ in Tasmania, Tasmanian Government Gazette, No 21 953, 
20 March 2020, 141, as amended by ‘Amendment of Declaration of State of Emergency’ in Tasmania, 
Tasmania Government Gazette, No 21 593, 20 March 2020, 141, last extended on 20 November 2020 until 13 
February 2021 by Section 15 Extension of Declaration of State of Emergency 2020 (Tas). Victoria: ‘Declaration 
of a State of Emergency’ in Victoria, Victoria Government Gazette, No S 129, 16 March 2020, last extended on 
29 January 2021 until 26 February 2021 by Extension of Declaration of a State of Emergency 2021 (Vic). 
Western Australia: Declaration of State of Emergency 2020 (WA) (declared 15 March 2020) last extended 4 
February 2021 until 18 February 2021 by Extension of State of Emergency Declaration 2021 (WA). In terms of 
external territories, see Christmas Island: Declaration of State of Emergency 2020 (Christmas Island) (declared 
18 March 2020) last extended on 27 January 2021 until 30 January 2021 (in 72-hour periods only) by Extension 
of Declaration of State of Emergency 2021 (Christmas Island); Cocos (Keeling) Islands: Declaration of State of 
Emergency 2021 (Cocos (Keeling) Islands) (declared 18 March 2020) last extended on 27 January 2021 until 30 
January 2021 (in 72-hour periods only) by Extension of Declaration of State of Emergency 2021 (Cocos 
(Keeling) Islands); Jervis Bay: Declaration of State of Emergency (Jervis Bay Territory) (No 1) 2021 (Jervis 
Bay), repealing all previous Declarations of a state of emergency. 
23 ICCPR art 12(3).  
24 Gillian Triggs, ‘We Can Secure Both Public Health and the Rights of Refugees to Protection’, Kaldor Centre 
for International Refugee Law (Blog Post, 8 April 2020) 
<https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/we-can-secure-both-public-health-and-rights-refugees-
protection>. 
25 Kristine A Moore et al, COVID-19: The CIDRAP Viewpoint (Report, 30 April 2020) 5–6 
<https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/sites/default/files/public/downloads/cidrap-covid19-viewpoint-part1_0.pdf>. 
26 Refugee Convention art 1(A)(2). 
27 Andrew E Shacknove, ‘Who Is a Refugee?’ (1985) 95(2) Ethics 274, 283. 
28 See, eg, Refugee Convention art 33; ICCPR arts 6–7. 
 
 
‘mobility is an essential, even a life-saving act’,29 and COVID-19 affects refugees ‘at the most 
fundamental level – their ability to seek protection in another country’.30 
 
However, faced with a pandemic that ‘knows no boundaries’,31 states have adopted numerous 
and significant additional emergency measures to slow or halt movement more generally. 
Border closures have been a common and preferred response by states, followed by health 
requirements, changes to visa conditions, and entry restrictions for certain nationalities.32 By 
July 2020, 219 states and territories had implemented 71,589 restrictive measures, 
predominantly relating to borders and entry.33 Further, at least 99 states had made no exception 
for people seeking asylum.34 Search and rescue operations in the central Mediterranean were 
temporarily suspended,35 and UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (‘IOM’) 
announced an unprecedented temporary freeze on global resettlement.36 While these agencies 
have since announced the resumption of resettlement departures for refugees,37 Australia – the 
third largest resettlement country – halted its resettlement program in March 2020, with no 
indication as to when it may resume.38 
                                                 
29 Laura Hammond, ‘Mobility and Immobility in the Time of Coronavirus: Reflections from Long-Term Study 
of Migration and Displacement’ (Annual Elizabeth Colson Lecture, University of Oxford, 24 June 2020) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DKvO1o9uM9E>. 
30 Harriet Spinks, ‘Seeking Asylum in the Time of Coronavirus: COVID-19 Pandemic Effect on Refugees and 
People Seeking Asylum’, Flagpost (Blog Post, 19 May 2020) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2020/
May/COVID-19_-_impacts_on_refugees_and_asylum_seekers>. 
31 Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University, Migration and Human Rights Program at Cornell 
Law School, and the Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility, ‘Human Mobility and Human Rights in the 
COVID-19 Pandemic: Principles of Protection for Migrants, Refugees, and other Displaced Persons’ (Web 
Page, 2020) 4 <https://zolberginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Human-mobility-and-human-rights-in-
the-COVID_final-1.pdf > (‘Protection Principles’); endorsed by 1,000 legal experts: ‘Mobility in the Time of 
COVID-19’, Zolberg Institution on Migration and Mobility (Web Page, 2020) 
<https://zolberginstitute.org/covid-19/>. 
32 IOM, ‘Global Mobility Restriction Overview: Bi-Weekly Update’ (COVID-19 Mobility Impacts Update 
Series, 9 July 2020) 1 <https://migration.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/DTM-
Covid19%20Global%20Overview%20Output%2009.07.2020%20Final_3.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=9182>.  
33 Ibid. See also, ‘Coronavirus: Travel Restrictions, Border Shutdowns by Country’, Al Jazeera (online, 3 June 
2020) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/coronavirus-travel-restrictions-border-shutdowns-country-
200318091505922.html>. 
34 United Nations, COVID-19 and People on the Move (Policy Brief, June 2020) 19 
<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/76793>; 81 states made no exception as of 11 March 2021: see 
‘COVID-19 Platform’ (n 12). 
35 Hans HP Kluge et al, ‘Refugee and Migrant Health in the COVID-19 Response’ (2020) 395(10232) The 
Lancet 1237, 1238. 
36 UNHCR, ‘IOM, UNHCR Announce Temporary Suspension of Resettlement Travel for Refugees’ (Press 
Release, 17 March 2020) <https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/press/2020/3/5e7103034/iom-unhcr-announce-
temporary-suspension-resettlement-travel-refugees.html>. 
37 See UNHCR, ‘Joint Statement: UN Refugee Chief Grandi and IOM’s Vitorino Announce Resumption of 
Resettlement Travel for Refugees’ (Press Release, 18 June 2020) <https://www.unhcr.org/en-
au/news/press/2020/6/5eeb85be4/joint-statement-un-refugee-chief-grandi-ioms-vitorino-announce-
resumption.html>, noting that that the suspension led to the delay in the departure of ‘some 10,000 refugees to 
resettlement countries’. 
38 Spinks (n 30). Persons whose visas were previously approved through the resettlement (humanitarian) 
program have not been exempted from the travel ban: ‘COVID-19 and the Border: Australian Citizens, 
Permanent Resident or New Zealand Citizens Usually Resident in Australia’, Department of Home Affairs (Web 





Restrictions on refugees’ mobility are not new. Over the past three decades, in particular, states 
have adopted widespread measures of containment, detention, interception, pushbacks, 
turnbacks and so on, designed to deter people from seeking asylum in the first place, or to 
thwart their attempts to do so.39 Thus, while the border restrictions imposed on account of 
COVID-19 are extreme, they are a stark reminder of the extant ‘global mobility divide’.40 Even 
prior to the pandemic, much of the world’s population could not travel freely. The privilege of 
mobility belongs to relatively few: many people do not hold passports, which also makes visas 
(and thus many countries) inaccessible.41 This necessarily impacts on people’s ability to access 
protection from persecution or other serious harm, whether on account of conflict, general 
violence or disasters.   
 
Refugees’ particular vulnerabilities have been further exacerbated by the impossibility of 
maintaining physical distancing and other COVID-19 safety measures in overcrowded camps 
and detention centres.42 Movement restrictions have impeded access to livelihoods and access 
to basic services,43 such as social protection, public health, education, child protection, income 
support, and social networks to manage periods of self-isolation.44 In some cases, refugees have 
been explicitly excluded from them.45 For example, in Australia, asylum seekers have been 
                                                 
39 Daniel Ghezelbash, Refuge Lost: Asylum Law in an Interdependent World (Cambridge University Press, 
2018) 44–6. See generally, Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘The Global Mobility Infrastructure: Reconceptualising the 
Externalisation of Migration Control’ (2018) 20(4) European Journal of Migration and Law 452; Cathryn 
Costello, ‘Refugees and (Other) Migrants: Will the Global Compacts Ensure Safe Flight and Onward Mobility 
for Refugees?’ (2018) 30(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 643. See also Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen 
and Nikolas Feith Tan, ‘Extraterritorial Migration Control and Deterrence’ in Cathryn Costello, Michelle Foster 
and Jane McAdam (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law (Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming) ch 27; and Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Protection at Sea and the Denial of Asylum’ in Costello, Foster 
and McAdam (eds) (n 39) ch 26. 
40 Henley & Partners, Henley Passport Index and Global Mobility Report (Report, 2019) 30 
<https://www.henleypassportindex.com/assets/2019/HPI%20Global%20Mobility%20Report_Final_190104.pdf
>. 
41 Ibid; Max J Andrucki, ‘The Visa Whiteness Machine: Transnational Motility in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ 
in France Winddance Twine and Bradley Gardener (eds), Geographies of Privilege (Routledge, 2013) 121. 
42 Nichole Georgeou and Charles Hawksley (eds), State Responses to COVID-19: A Global Snapshot at 1 June 
2020 (Report, 2020) 61–2, 79, 82 
<https://researchdirect.westernsydney.edu.au/islandora/object/uws%3A56288/datastream/PDF/view>. For 
instance, in Bangladesh as at 16 June 2020, 38 COVID-19 cases among refugee communities had been 
confirmed and two people had died.; however, it has been noted that noted that testing rates are low and that 
numbers are likely higher than has been reported: Amy Bainbridge, ‘A Coronavirus Crisis is Building Inside 
Cox’s Bazar, the World’s Largest Refugee Camp’, ABC News (online, 16 June 2020) 
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-16/rohingya-refugees-coxs-bazar-coronavirus/12356046>. The United 
Nations has noted that COVID-19 lockdown measures have disrupted supply chains, affecting availability of 
fresh food to refugee camps in Bangladesh: ‘Three Years after Exodus, Rohingya Refugees “More Vulnerable 
than Ever”’, UN News (online, 25 August 2020) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1070962>. The 
pandemic has led to the World Food Programme postponing e-voucher programmes, currently providing food 
assistance to almost 88% of the refugees. It had previously hoped to increase support to everyone living in 
refugee camps by early 2020. Education centres in the camps have been closed since March 2020, resulting in 
disrupted schooling of more than 300,000 children.  
43 UNHCR, Global COVID-19 Emergency Response (Report, 11 August 2020) 3 
<https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/11082020_updated%20UNHCR%20Global%20COVID-
19%20Emergency%20Response.pdf> (‘Global COVID-19 Emergency Response’). 
44 IOM, Integrating Migration into COVID-19 Socio-Economic Response: A Toolkit for Development Partners 
(Report, August 2020) <https://eea.iom.int/sites/default/files/publication/document/MMICD-Toolkit-




denied pandemic-specific social security support.46 Yet, as UNHCR has observed, ‘the virus 
does not distinguish between nationals or migrants, and having a two-tiered system in place 
to access [for example] essential medical service during this health crisis serves no one’s 
interest’.47 
 
At the same time, the urgency of the pandemic opened up possibilities for states to respond in 
more inclusive ways. Indeed, UNHCR noted that ‘adaptability’ is a sign of a quality asylum 
system,48 and several states continued to register asylum seekers and issue documentation to 
ensure their legal stay and access to services.49 More novel approaches included Portugal’s 
granting of ‘temporary citizenship’ to all people in its territory whose asylum or residency 
applications were pending.50 Jordan agreed to consider Asylum-Seeker and Refugee 
Certificates issued by UNHCR as valid until the end of 2020, even if the certificates technically 
expired sooner.51 Malta, Azerbaijan, and the United Kingdom implemented ‘innovative 
approaches’, such as allowing online applications for asylum, appeals, and/or documentation.52 
Canada announced that it would provide a pathway to permanent residence for asylum seekers 
who had been working in the health-care sector during the COVID-19 pandemic, provided that 
various conditions were met.53 In Ireland and Latvia, older refugees and those with underlying 
medical conditions were guaranteed increased medical attention.54 A number of states, 
including Belgium, Mexico, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States, began 
to release asylum seekers from detention to reduce the number of people in closed facilities,55 
and to establish alternatives, particularly for children, families, and more vulnerable refugees.56 
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Finally, across the globe, refugee-led initiatives provided vital community-based services and 
support.57 
 
III INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY 
 
As is clear from the above, notwithstanding some positive state practice, the pandemic has 
posed challenges to the core of refugee protection, which is predicated on mobility. Since a 
person cannot meet the international definition of ‘refugee’ until they leave their country, the 
right to leave is paramount. Further, since almost no state provides for an ‘asylum seeker visa’ 
to be lodged from outside the putative state of asylum, movement to seek and obtain protection 
is crucial.  
 
A The Right to Leave 
 
Despite movement being central to the Refugee Convention, the treaty itself is silent on the 
right to leave. That right is instead found in article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (‘UDHR’)58 and article 12(2) of the widely ratified ICCPR, which provides that 
‘[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own’.59 Given its wide ambit, the 
right is not confined to those wishing to flee their countries of origin but extends to refugees in 
intermediary countries or otherwise en route to seeking asylum.  
 
There is a large literature on states’ attempts to obfuscate the right to leave and, with it, the 
right to seek asylum.60 The current crisis, however, raises the pertinence of permitted 
exceptions to the right to leave in a more pressing manner than may previously have been the 
case. Article 12(3) of the ICCPR provides that the right to leave ‘shall not be subject to any 
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, 
public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and 
are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant’.61 
 
This right may also be the subject of derogation under article 4(3) of the ICCPR, although the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee (‘UN Human Rights Committee’) has warned states 
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that in the context of the pandemic, derogation is not necessary in relation to rights such as 
article 12 of the ICCPR that already facilitate states to ‘attain their public health or other public 
policy objectives by invoking the possibility to restrict certain rights’.62 It is important to note 
that while some other widely-ratified human rights treaties permit similar restrictions on the 
right to leave,63 article 18(1)(c) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(‘CRPD’), ratified by 182 states parties, permits no limitations on or derogation from the right 
to leave.64 This has been largely overlooked in the discussion of the pandemic, yet it is 
estimated that between 15 and 30% of refugees may meet the treaty’s definition of ‘persons 
with disability’;65 hence, it is not an insignificant issue.  
 
In terms of article 12(3)’s limitation, given that public health is a legitimate restriction, and 
assuming that relevant measures are imposed by law, an analysis of state practice turns on the 
question of necessity,66 proportionality,67 and consistency of the measure with other ICCPR 
rights. To this end, blanket prohibitions or limitations rarely meet these requirements. As 
international law experts recently observed in the context of COVID-19 mobility restrictions: 
 
Where necessary to protect public health, border closures should be subject to exceptions for 
compelling humanitarian and compassionate needs and that ensure that a State’s international 
obligations can be respected (including the right to seek and enjoy asylum).68 
 
Ogg rightly notes that prohibiting exit in the context of asylum may violate the ‘right to life 
(article 6(1) ICCPR) and the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (article 7 ICCPR)’ where a person is at risk of such harm within their 
own state.69 Of course, a practical issue arises as to the efficacy of humanitarian exceptions to 
a prohibition on flight where the state is the persecutor and yet also needs to grant permission 
to leave. 
 
B Protection against Refoulement 
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In lieu of a positive and enforceable right to asylum, protection against refoulement is regarded 
as the fundamental norm of refugee protection. There is widespread agreement that it has 
attained the status of customary international law, and there is a strong case for its recognition 
as jus cogens.70 
 
Under article 33 of the Refugee Convention, the primary obligation is framed widely: a state 
may not return ‘in any manner whatsoever’ a refugee to the ‘frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened’.71 Near-universal support exists for its extraterritorial 
application,72 meaning that it is relevant to ‘externalisation’ and containment practices that 
have been strengthened during the crisis. Most relevantly, however, the absolute ban imposed 
by many states on non-citizens’ entry, without any exception for asylum seekers, and the 
concomitant pushback and return policies implemented by some states during the crisis (eg 
Greece to Turkey, Malta to Libya, and the United States to Mexico),73 clearly implicate article 
33. 
 
Unlike its equivalent in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’)74 and the ICCPR,75 the prohibition against 
refoulement in article 33(1) is not absolute. No state may make a reservation in relation to 
article 33 of the Refugee Convention,76 but article 33(2) provides that: 
 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to 
the community of that country.  
 
As an exception to a fundamental norm, this provision must be read narrowly. On its own 
terms, it is not relevant to the pandemic since a public health risk can neither come within the 
concepts ‘danger to the security of the country’ nor ‘danger to the community’ (and the latter 
in any event only applies in the case of a conviction). As UNHCR has emphatically stated, 
‘[d]enial of access to territory without safeguards to protect against refoulement cannot be 
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justified on the grounds of any health risk’.77 Further, article 33(2) clearly envisages an 
individuated assessment; blanket prohibitions cannot be justified.78 
 
The notion that an emergency may impact on refugee rights is not new. Significant global 
events producing large-scale movements have raised the question whether states can suspend 
obligations in situations of ‘mass influx’ or other equally challenging contexts, particularly in 
the Global South, which disproportionately bears responsibility for 85% of the world’s 
refugees.79 Yet, even in that context, the obligation to respect non-refoulement is held to be 
sacrosanct.80 
 
An often-overlooked provision in the Refugee Convention is article 9, which provides: 
 
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or other grave and 
exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally measures which it considers to be essential 
to the national security in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by the 
Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such measures 
is necessary in his case in the interests of national security. 
 
This ‘rather vague’ provision has rarely been analysed in detail, particularly regarding its 
contemporary meaning.81 Commentators have suggested that article 9 could be enlivened by 
‘grave instances of cold war, international crisis calling for certain internal precautions, or a 
state of emergency’;82 a situation bordering on war;83 or the threat of terrorism.84 The drafting 
records show that the term ‘grave and exceptional circumstances’ was intended to capture the 
grey area between a ‘national emergency’ (considered to be too narrow) and ‘national security’ 
(considered to be too broad).85 
 
At first blush, it seems plausible to argue that a global pandemic could amount to a ‘grave and 
exceptional circumstance’, even if this was not specifically contemplated by the drafters. A 
more difficult question is whether it would come within the narrower language of ‘national 
security in the case of a particular person’ (which further conditions the objective to be pursued 
by any restrictive measures). This narrow language is not coincidental: Hathaway explains that 
‘[t]he drafters of the Convention considered, but did not adopt, an all-embracing power of 
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derogation in time of national crisis’.86 The drafters also rejected the inclusion of additional 
reasons for invoking ‘provisional measures’, such as ‘public order’ concerns.87 It would 
therefore be difficult to justify measures to contain the pandemic as matters of ‘national 
security’.88 In any event, provisional measures cannot include refoulement, and any measures 
need to be applied on an individual basis: article 9 is not a true derogation clause,89 but rather 
permits provisional measures ‘in the case of a particular person’.90 Indeed, Davy argues that 
‘there are strong reasons to doubt that measures under [article] 9 … are permissible under 
human rights law’,91 and that human rights law has rendered the provision nugatory.92 
 
In sum, there is no justification for blanket violations of the principle of non-refoulement in 
the pandemic crisis. 
 
C Refugee Rights 
 
As outlined in Part II, serious human rights issues have been raised in connection with the 
treatment of asylum seekers and refugees during the pandemic, ranging from inadequate public 
health measures, especially in closed detention, through to exclusion from welfare support. 
 
When it comes to the movement of refugees within a country, the Refugee Convention protects 
freedom of movement for those who are lawfully present.93 States may restrict the movement 
of refugees who have arrived without prior authorisation, but only where such restrictions do 
not amount to penalties94, are ‘necessary’, and only ‘until their status in the country is 
regularized or they obtain admission into another country’.95  
 
This is supplemented by the ICCPR’s protection of freedom of movement,96 prohibition of 
arbitrary detention,97 and its requirement that ‘all persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’.98 
Immigration detention, including of asylum seekers, is still common and states that do not 
ensure detainees have appropriate protection against COVID-19 are arguably in violation of 
these obligations. Indeed, the UN Human Rights Committee has emphasised in relation to the 
pandemic that states 
 
may not derogate from their duty to treat all persons, including persons deprived of their liberty, 
with humanity and respect for their human dignity, and must pay special attention to the adequacy 
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of health conditions and health services in places of incarceration, and also to the rights of 
individuals in situations of confinement …99 
 
As mentioned above, while some states have released asylum seekers and refugees from 
detention as a precautionary measure, this has at times resulted from specific court orders.100 
However, in states without a bill of rights or domestically-incorporated international human 
rights obligations (such as Australia), litigation to seek the release of immigration detainees 
due to concerns about COVID-19 has so far had very limited success.101 Indeed, in Australia, 
the numbers of people held in immigration detention has risen – not declined – in recent 
months,102 and their conditions have been made more challenging due to the suspension of the 
immigration detention visitor program on 24 March 2020, which in Victoria, has been further 
expanded to include a bar on the personal delivery or collection of ‘gifts, property and other 
items’ to persons in detention.103  
 
Denial of access to welfare and other social support directly engages the Refugee Convention. 
It requires states to accord to ‘lawfully staying’ refugees the ‘same treatment with respect to 
public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals’,104 and ‘the same treatment as is 
accorded to nationals’ in respect of ‘[s]ocial security’, including unemployment benefits.105 
These rights may not be suspended pursuant to article 9 where a person has been found to be a 
refugee, and in any event cannot be suspended on a group basis.106 The question of whether a 
refugee is ‘lawfully staying’ is more complex, yet this term must be given an autonomous 
meaning independent of the policies of certain states, such as the provision of only ‘temporary’ 
visas to recognised refugees.107 
 
                                                 
99 Human Rights Committee, Statement on Derogation (n 62) [2(e)].  
100 See, eg, in the United Kingdom, R (SML) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 5 WLUK 
148. Shah notes that in the United States, as at the end of June 2020, ‘more than 100 lawsuits have been filed in 
federal courts seeking relief on behalf of non-citizens in ICE custody at heightened risk of serious illness or 
death due to the virus’: Aditi Shah, ‘The Role of Federal Courts in Coronavirus-Related Immigration Detention 
Litigation’, Lawfare (Blog Post, 29 June 2020) <lawfareblog.com/role-federal-courts-coronavirus-related-
immigration-detention-litigation>. 
101 In BNL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1180, a diabetic detainee over the age of 65, and in poor 
health, was said to be at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19: at [6] (Murphy J). It was argued that this 
warranted injunctive relief requiring the Minister not to hold the person in Melbourne Immigration Transit 
Accommodation (MITA): at [3] (Murphy J). At [103] Murphy J ordered that: ‘the respondent, as soon as 
reasonably practicable but in any event no later than 1.00pm on the 13 August 2020, [would] cease to detain the 
applicant at the [Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation centre] until further order’. However, this did 
not result in release into community but rather transfer to Yongah Hill Immigration Detention Centre: BNL20 v 
State Emergency Coordinator and Commissioner of Police [2020] WASC 315.  
102 See Department of Home Affairs, Immigration Detention and Community Statistics (Report, 31 May 2020) 
4, 6–7 <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-stats/files/immigration-detention-statistics-31-may-
2020.pdf>, noting an increase of 41 people in immigration detention centres and facilities in Australia since the 
last reporting period in the previous month.  
103 ‘COVID-19 and the Border: Immigration Detention’, Department of Home Affairs (Web Page, 11 August 
2020) <https://web.archive.org/web/20201015071511/https://covid19.homeaffairs.gov.au/immigration-
detention>.  
104 Refugee Convention (n 4) art 23. 
105 Ibid art 24(1)(b). 
106 We note that Davy argues that article 9 does authorise large-scale actions, but this appears to be inconsistent 
with the text itself (‘in the case of a particular person …’): at (n 81) 800. 
107 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law: Second Edition (n 86) 213–15. 
 
 
Under the ICESCR, the non-discrimination obligation applies ‘to everyone including non-
nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons [and] migrant workers’108 and is 
not subject to progressive realisation. Further, the ICESCR has no derogation clause.109 As 
such, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has urged the treaty’s 171 state 
parties, as ‘a matter of urgency’, to adopt ‘special, targeted measures, including through 
international cooperation, to protect and mitigate the impact of the pandemic on vulnerable 
groups such as … refugees’.110 Hence, there is no justification for excluding asylum seekers, 
refugees, or stateless persons from protective economic and social measures during the 
pandemic; indeed, as Scheinin points out, some human rights treaties, such as the CRPD, ‘call 
for heightened protection in situations of crisis’.111 
 
Finally, the ICCPR contains a freestanding equality and non-discrimination clause in article 26 
which ‘is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant’.112 While it is 
possible for states to derogate from some ICCPR rights ‘[i]n time of public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed’,113 this power 
is closely circumscribed. Any derogation measures must: (1) only extend to what is strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation; (2) not be inconsistent with states’ other obligations 
under international law; and (3) not involve ‘discrimination solely on the ground of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin’.114 An ‘unprecedented’ number of states have 
lodged formal notices of derogation in response to COVID-19,115 but none has purported to 
justify the exclusion of vulnerable groups, such as asylum seekers, from special safety net 
measures. Indeed, such an attempt would be unlawful in light of the non-discrimination 
requirement, pertinent to derogation, which includes ‘race’ and ‘social origin’.  
 
In all circumstances, derogations are envisaged as ‘exceptional and temporary’.116 Reflecting 
the principle of proportionality, they are limited ‘to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation’, and ‘must, as far as possible, be limited in duration, geographical 
coverage and material scope’.117 The predominant objective is to restore ‘a state of normalcy 
where full respect for the Covenant can again be secured’,118 which means that, where possible, 
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‘States parties should replace COVID-19-related measures that prohibit activities relevant to 
the enjoyment of rights under the Covenant with less restrictive measures’.119 Additional 
derogation notifications are required if a state extends the duration of a state of emergency.120 
 
The analysis above suggests that the problem lies not with the normative framework: the 
Refugee Convention, despite its longevity, is particularly attentive to the need to account for 
the legitimate interests of states in delivering refugee protection, including in the context of 
emergencies, and human rights treaties similarly permit flexibility. Yet, the invocation of the 
language of crisis appears to have given many states carte blanche to act in violation of 
international refugee law. 
 
IV PERMANENT ‘CRISIS’? CLIMATE CHANGE, DISPLACEMENT, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Crises are not just one-off events but can encompass slower processes of change or 
deterioration as well.121 Understanding this is important, because it lifts our gaze beyond the 
here and now to contemplate policy responses over the longer-term. The challenge is to 
overcome the human tendency to give ‘overwhelmingly higher importance … to events or 
effects which will take place in the short term compared to the long term’122 – an approach that 
effectively guarantees future emergencies and their attendant restrictions on human rights. How 
might the urgency generated by COVID-19 help to drive more measured, considered and 
sustainable policies to address the ‘slow motion’ crisis of climate change?123 
 
If we think about crisis in an extended timeframe, we can identify interventions now that could 
avert future shocks. Many of the measures taken during the pandemic, for instance, are relevant 
to preparing for the impacts of climate change: ‘the need to identify vulnerable populations, 
assess the capacity of public health systems, develop and invest in preparedness measures, and 
emphasise community resilience and equity’.124 But whereas COVID-19 has resulted in 
unprecedented measures of containment, the impacts of climate change will contribute to 
widespread displacement. Disasters – many of which are exacerbated by climate change125 – 
accounted for 75% of all new global internal displacement (24.9 million people) in 2019.126 
Cross-border movement is anticipated to rise as well, especially since internal displacement 
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may transform into displacement across borders if people cannot find safety and security in 
their own country.127  
 
Existing international protection mechanisms offer an incomplete and imperfect solution for 
those seeking to escape the longer-term impacts of climate change. There are a number of 
reasons for this,128 including that some effects will take years to manifest at a sufficiently 
harmful level to satisfy the requisite thresholds in international refugee law and international 
human rights law.129 The challenge for international lawyers – and international law – is 
whether those bodies of law can evolve dynamically to offer solutions, as they have done 
historically as ‘living instruments’ of protection.  
 
Certainly, as understandings of the nature of mobility in the context of climate change and 
disasters have improved, our analysis of the capacity of existing frameworks to respond has 
become more nuanced.130 At the same time, however, approaching displacement solely in light 
of extant protection frameworks – or even in terms of a treaty-based regime – ‘necessarily 
constrains our thinking, both conceptually and pragmatically’.131 As Fisher, Scotford and 
Barritt have argued, ‘the international treaty process is seen as the ultimate panacea’,132 but 
there are many reasons why this alone will not provide a solution for those on the move.133 
Addressing displacement related to the impacts of climate change requires a holistic, 
multidisciplinary, and multi-sectoral approach, which is best approached through a ‘toolkit’ 
response that encompasses disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, humanitarian 
protection, migration, and planned relocation.134  
 
For instance, in late 2019, the UN Human Rights Committee accepted in principle that it is 
unlawful for states to send people to places where the impacts of climate change expose them 
to life-threatening risks or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.135 However, in the matter 
at hand, the evidence ‘did not establish that [the complainant] faced a risk of an imminent, or 
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likely, risk of arbitrary deprivation of life upon return to Kiribati’.136 This was despite the 
Committee’s acknowledgment that sea-level rise was ‘likely to render the Republic of Kiribati 
uninhabitable’, potentially within ten to 15 years.137 At present, there was insufficient evidence 
to show that the complainant would ‘be unable to grow food or access potable water’ or would 
‘face life-threatening environmental conditions’, or that ‘the Government of Kiribati had failed 
to take programmatic steps to provide for the basic necessities of life, in order to meet its 
positive obligation to fulfill the author’s right to life’.138 The Committee recognised that 
conditions in Kiribati ‘may become incompatible with the right to life with dignity before the 
risk is realized’,139 thus tacitly acknowledging that people should not have to wait until their 
lives are imminently threatened before they are eligible for protection.140 However, it did not 
provide guidance as to when such a point of incompatibility might be reached.141  
 
This underscores the need for proactive policies to help build resilience within affected 
communities and provide lawful opportunities for movement. While the current rate of global 
warming means that some displacement is inevitable,142 the scale of displacement – and 
attendant economic, social and human costs – could be radically reduced if strategic policy 
measures were taken now. A World Bank Report posits that robust mitigation and adaptation 
measures could cut global internal displacement by almost two-thirds by 2050.143 Indeed, 
mitigation might be understood as the climate change equivalent of a COVID-19 vaccine. In 
addition, disaster risk reduction, increased opportunities for lawful migration, more systematic 
humanitarian responses to displacement, and selective planned relocations could help avert 
future displacement and enable people to make real choices about whether they stay in their 
homes, or move elsewhere. As the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction has 
estimated, there could be a 60-fold return for each dollar spent on preparing for disasters.144  
 
The climate crisis is an unfolding process, and interventions must be contemplated over longer 
timeframes, with new combinations of institutional actors, partnerships, and sustainable 
funding models. Indeed, without such interventions, the climate crisis ‘could prove far 
lengthier and far more disruptive than what we currently see with the coronavirus’.145 The 
challenge lies in generating support for policy change now to avert devastating consequences in 
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the future, heeding the advice of scientific and other experts. Whereas with COVID-19, ‘the 
consequences from inaction can be seen relatively quickly, as hospitals are overwhelmed by 
patients infected several weeks ago’, with climate change, ‘it will take decades to see the full 
extent of the damage’.146 On the one hand, this longer timeframe offers an opportunity for 
greater international cooperation towards a coherent response than emergency (and often 
exclusionary) measures allow. On the other hand, it may (and often does) mean that the crisis 
is perceived as a problem of the future alone, rather than one that is already having far-reaching 




Movement and non-movement are not black and white. As some state practice during the 
pandemic has shown, mobility may be restricted, but still permitted. Quarantine and testing can 
reduce the risk of virus transmission,147 enabling people in some of the most vulnerable 
circumstances to be assisted.  
 
This article has shown the continuing relevance of the Refugee Convention (and other human 
rights treaties) in the context of emergencies such as COVID-19, in particular, by 
acknowledging the legitimate interests of states in refugee protection. However, when faced 
with a crisis that is unfolding over a longer timeframe, such as climate change, the question is 
whether this body of law will evolve dynamically beyond emergency measures to greater 
international cooperation, without losing the sense of urgency and making it a problem for the 
future alone. It is also important that the narrative of crisis does not lead to paralysis because 
the policy challenges are perceived as insurmountable.148 For this reason, emphasising 
proactive measures that can avert future catastrophes – as detailed in the preceding section – 
may engender a more solutions-oriented approach.  
 
As the UNHCR has noted, it is only by respecting human rights that ‘we will build better 
responses for the emergency today and solutions for recovery in the longer term’.149 This 
requires greater international collaboration, responsibility-sharing and cooperation, as 
promised by states when they adopted the twin Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration 
in late 2018.150 To date, however, these commitments have not withstood the pandemic crisis, 
despite efforts by the UNHCR, IOM, and others to show how these instruments can assist, 
rather than hinder, responses.151 Whether this is a temporary aberration or hardens into a 
permanent pattern remains to be seen. COVID-19 has demonstrated that a ‘large-scale, 
comprehensive response’ is ‘the only way to withstand and manage any future unprecedented 
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health and climate crisis’, and that we do, in fact, have ‘the technology, scientific 
understanding, financial means and human resourcefulness’ needed to address it.152 We can 
only hope, therefore, that the United Nations Secretary-General’s ambition for COVID-19 to 
offer an opportunity to ‘reimagine human mobility’153 comes to be exemplified by protection, 
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